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史開始°當中所涉及到的密碼學(Cryptography),例如公匙(public k e y ) �電子證書 
(digital certificate)及先分後選(cut-and-choose)方法亦有介紹 ° 電子現金(electronic 
cash汲微額付款(micropaymenO協定的模型亦有仔細地被解釋。 
我們在這論文中也有提出一種新的微額付款模式：不記名微額付款票 
(anonymous micropayment ticket) °可是，電子現金所作出的貢獻並不限於作爲一 
種數碼交易媒介。我們由電子現金協定中硏究出兩種創新的密碼學應用：分別 
是不可轉用的電子投票通行証(non-transferable electronic voting pass)及不記名的 
上網服務(anonymous Internet access service)�這些應用皆會在這論文中闡述° 
Abstract 
As we are now situated in the Digital Age, many of the everyday applications 
have been transformed from their traditional formats into the electronic and 
on-line ones. In fact, the blooming of electronic commerce has brought many 
beneficial changes to our daily lives, which include increased number of choices, 
efficiency as well as convenience. At the same time, a new form of money is 
demanded so that it can support the smooth running of the digital economy. 
In this thesis, we make a thorough study on electronic money, which begins 
from the history of money. The cryptography involving, such as public key 
digital signatures and cut-aiid-choose methodology are also introduced. Basic 
models of electronic cash and micropayment protocols are explained in details. 
We also proposed a new format of micropayment: the Anonymous Micro-
payment Ticket. However, the contribution of electronic cash is not limited to 
being a digital medium of transaction. In this thesis, two more innovative cryp-
tographic applications, namely the Non-Transferable Electronic Voting Passes 
and the Anonymous Internet Access Services are derived from the electronic 
cash protocols. All of these applications are described in this thesis. 
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We are now living in the Digital Society. Many of the last decade researches 
have already turned into everyday applications. Examples include a numerous 
of electronic commerce applications and the WAP mobile phone. On 7 March 
2000, the first official Internet voting was conducted in Arizona, which made a 
remarkable milestone for the Digital Age. 
Suitable payment systems are necessary for supporting the transaction of 
goods and services in the Digital Economy. In fact the invention of electronic 
money greatly enhances the smooth running of electronic commerce. In the 
early days of human history when money is not yet invented, people practiced 
barter. Later physical commodities such as seashells, animals and tobacco were 
accepted as a medium of transaction, while the Lydians made the first coins 
in 700 BC. Since then the formats of money are being developed and modified 
continuously. 
The first proposal of using numbers to represent coins was made by David 
Chaum in 1983 [1]. According to this paper, an electronic cash system consists of 
1 
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electronic coins which are numbers. Today there are hundreds of proposed 
electronic cash systems, while some of them are circulating in the market. In 
fact, electronic payment systems are the most suitable form of transaction for 
electronic commerce because they can be built and run on the same media. 
According to a survey conducted in June 1999 [2], the global electronic com-
merce market would reach 300 billion US dallars by the end of 2000, as shown 
in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: The Growth in Global E-Commerce Revenues (1997-2003) 
Therefore the demand for more convenient and secure electronic cash systems 
is ever increasing. 
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1.1 Transition to a New Monetary System 
Money is a widely accepted medium of exchange, which is essential for a smoothly-
running market system. Along with the growth of the digital economy, electronic 
money is also gaining its significance. Government fiat money is likely to be re-
placed by stored value cards and electronic cash. An everyday example is the 
popularity of the Octopus system, which is a stored value card system designed 
for the public transportation system in Hong Kong. Another example is the 
Mondex [3] system which is now becoming popular among the university cam-
puses. 
1.2 Security and Cryptography 
Security is an essential concern in the monetary system. In the paper-based 
monetary system, for example, special features are included so as to prevent 
counterfeiting. Extra cost on security guard is also required when transferring 
the money from one location to another. 
In electronic money systems, a comparable level of security is also required, 
which is realized by cryptography. Therefore, electronic cash researches fall 
into the category of Cryptography because a lot of cryptographic primitives are 
involved in the design of an electronic cash systems. For example, the official 
watermark on paper cash is achieved by digital signatures electronically, while 
zero-knowledge proofs are employed in double spending prevention. 
3 « 
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1.3 Electronic Cash: More than an Electronic 
Medium of Transaction 
While electronic cash plays a very important role in the digital economy, its 
innovations are not limited to merely a digital medium of transaction. Different 
applications such as Electronic Voting, Micropayment Systems and Anonymous 
Internet Access are derived from the electronic cash protocols. These applica-
tions share some similar cryptographic techniques that have been employed in 
electronic cash protocols. In this thesis, a thorough study on electronic cash and 
the underlying cryptography is made. Besides, three other innovative applica-
tions are proposed, namely 
1. The anonymous micropayment tickets 
2. Non-transferable electronic voting passes 
3. Anonymous Internet access services via proxy servers 
These applications are motivated and derived by the electronic cash protocols. 
In the first application, a new concept of electronic payment: micropayment 
in form of an electronic ticket is proposed. The micropayment ticket is deigned 
for transactions of small amount. In addition, unlike most of the micropayment 
protocols, user anonymity is supported, such feature is achieved by the elliptic 
curve digital signature. 
In the second application, a new feature of receipt-free electronic voting sys-
tem is proposed. In early electronic voting papers, a receipt was generated and 
returned to the voter so as to prevent any modification of a submitted ballot. 
, 4 
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However, such receipt could be used as an evidence of the choice made by a 
voter, thus allowed the selling of votes. Because of this, the concept of receipt-
free electronic voting was proposed by some researchers. However, we find out a 
serious security threat in most of the cryptography-based receipt-free electronic 
voting systems: the voting right is transferable. Therefore, we have designed 
a new cut-and-choose authentication algorithm, in which the private key is in-
volved while in the initial phase the prover remains anonymous. This algorithm 
enables the non-transferability of voting right in a receipt-free electronic voting 
system, which is essential requirement in a fair voting. 
In the third application, we proposed an anonymous Internet access services 
via proxy server, which is motivated by the electronic cash protocol. When a 
user access the Internet through the proxy server resides in the Internet Services 
Provider, information such as when and how long the user has accessed the web, 
which web sites have been visited and which Internet objects were requested 
etc are recorded. This enables one's Internet usage habit being analyzed and is 
a threat to the Internet privacy. Therefore we have designed a cryptographic 
application which provides conditional anonymity to the users. 
These applications will be described in details in this thesis. 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, cryptographic primitives that 
are involved in the thesis are explained, they include One-way Hush Function, Bit 
Commitment, Secret Splitting, Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption, Blind 
Signature, the Cut-and-choose Protocol, the RSA Public Key Crypto system and 
. 5 
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the Elliptic Curve Crypto system. Chapter 3 gives a general study on Money. 
This includes the history of money, the functions of money as well as some 
existing payment systems. Through this chapter we can obtain a general view 
of money and its features, so that the protocols introduced in the later chapters 
can be more easily understood. 
In Chapter 4 we discuss the electronic cash protocols. A basic model of 
electronic cash is described and several existing examples of electronic cash pro-
tocols are also introduced. In the last section of this chapter, we talk about the 
limitation of electronic cash protocols and the possible modifications. 
Chapter 5 is a discussion on the micropayment protocols. We emphasis on the 
efficiency that is required for the micropayment systems. A basic micropayment 
model is described and several existing examples of micropayments are also 
given. 
In chapter 6 to chapter 8，the three applications derived from the electronic 
cash protocols are described in details. 
Two publications have been derived from this thesis. Namely On Privacy 
Issues of Internet Access Services via Proxy Servers that derived from chapter 7 
and Anonymous Electronic Voting System with Non- Transferable Voting Passes 





Many of the procedures involved in the payment systems can be analog digitally. 
This is achieved by the cryptographic techniques. In this chapter, we explain 
the cryptographic primitives involved in the applications that are mentioned in 
this thesis. 
2.1 One-way Hash Functions 
A hash function h maps an input x to an output h(x). It is called one-way 
because it is computationally infeasible to calculate x from h(x). 
A two-argument one-way hash function takes two input x, y and generate an 
output h(x,y). It is computationally infeasible to calculate x and y from h(x,y). 
, 7 
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2.2 The Bit Commitment Protocol 
Suppose Alice wants to commit to a prediction but does not want to reveal this 
prediction to Bob before a certain point of time. And Bob, at the same time， 
wants to ensure that Alice cannot change her mind once she has committed to 
the prediction. In such case, a bit commitment protocol can be employed. 
The following steps describe how Alice commits on a bit b: 
1. Alice generates two random bit strings Ri and R2. 
2. Alice generate the following token: 
(RuR2,b) 
3. The message is hashed using some suitable one-way hash functions H{.). 
The follows are presented to Bob: 
4. Later when Alice opens her committed bit, she submits the followings: 
(RuR2,b) 
5. Bob hashes R2, b using H(.) and checks if the result is valid. If so, he 
accepts Alice's committed bit. 
2.3 Secret Splitting 
In the secret splitting scheme, a message is divided into pieces and each pieces 
give no information about the message [4]. When all pieces are put together, 
the message is recovered. 
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The algorithm is described by the following steps: 
1. A random bit string R which is the same length as the message M is 
generated. 
2. Obtain P by 
P = M®R 
where � denotes the binary XOR operation. 
3. The message is divided in to two pieces, P and R. 
The message M is recovered when one put P and R together: 
2.4 Encryption/Decryption 
Encryption is a process to transform a readable message (called the plaintext) 
into a format so that the original information can not be retrieved. An encryp-
tion key is used. The encrypted message is called the ciphertext. 
Decryption is a reverse process of encryption. It is the transformation of the 
ciphertext back to the plaintext with a decryption key. 
The encryption and decryption processes are described in the followings: 
Eek{P) = C 
Ddk(C) = P 
, 9 
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where P = the plaintext 
C = the ciphertext 
ek = the encryption key 
dk = the decryption key 
There are two kinds of encryptions: symmetric encryption and asymmetric 
encryption. 
2.4.1 Symmetric Encryption 
In symmetric encryption schemes, the encryption key is the same as the de-
cryption key. Therefore, the communicating parties should firstly agree on the 
encryption/decryption key. Examples of symmetric encryption include the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [5] [6]，Triple DES [7] and the International Data 
Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [8.. 
2.4.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
In asymmetric encryption schemes, the encryption key is different from the de-
cryption key. The receiver publishes the encryption key in a public directory so 
that potential senders can use this key to encrypt the message. And the receiver 
uses the privately stored decryption key to decrypt the message. The encryption 
key is called the public key and the decryption key is called the private key. 
Asymmetric encryption is also called the public key encryption. Examples 
include RSA [9] and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem [11] [12.. 
‘ 10 
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2.5 The RSA Public Key Cryptosystem 
The RSA public key cryptosystem [9] is very widely used in many cryptographic 
applications. It is named after its inventors, R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. 
Adleman. The security of RSA is based on the difficulty of factoring a very 
large number, which is the product of two large primes. 
We describe the mechanism of RSA public-key encryption in the following: 
To generate the RSA public and private key pairs: 
1. Two large distinct primes p and q, each roughly the same size, are gener-
ated. 
2. Compute n = p - q. 
3. Pick a large integer d such that 
9cd{d, {p-l).{q-l)) = l. 
4. Compute the integer e such that 
e . d 三 1 (mod {p - I) ' (q — 1)). 
5. The public key is (n, e), while the private key is d. 
The signature 5 on a message M using the private key d is 
s = Md (mod n). 
To verify the signature, one checks if the following equality holds: 
s® = M (mod n) 
‘ 11 
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The above equality holds if s is a signature on M using the private key d 
because 
d' e = l (mod (p _ 1) . (g _ 1)) 
and by the Little's Fermat's Theorem, 
s" = (M'^Y = = M (mod n). 
2.6 Blind Signature 
The blind signature technique was invented by David Chaum [1], which is based 
on the RSA algorithm. 
Suppose Alice wishes to obtain a blind signature from Bob, who has a public 
key e, a private key d and a public modulus n. To obtain Bob's signature on 
the message M while giving Bob no information on M, the following steps are 
taken: 
1. Alice choose a random integer r. 
2. Calculate 
r 三产.M (mod n). 
3. Bob signs on T with his private key d: 
T^ 三(r^ e. MY (mod n) 
and returns to Alice. 
‘ 12 
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4. Alice unblinds T^ by dividing T^ with r. 
5. A signature on M is obtained because: 
T”t 三（re. M Y / r 三 M " ( m o d n) 
Bob cannot read M because it is blinded by r. In order to protect Bob from 
being cheated by Alice, a cut-and-choose protocol [10] can be used along with 
the blind signature. We describe the cut-and-choose protocol protocol in the 
following section: 
2.7 Cut-and-choose procotol 
Suppose Alice and Bob are dividing a cake, in order to obtain a fair result, the 
following steps are taken: 
1. Alice cuts the thing in half. 
2. Bob chooses one of the halves for himself. 
3. Alice takes the remaining half. 
In this way a fair result can be obtained. It is in Alice's best interest to 
divide fairly in the first step, because and Bob is able to choose whichever half 
he wants. 
The cut-and-choose protocol can be applied along with the blind signature so 
as to protect Bob from being cheated by Alice [19]. This is described as follow: 
1. Alice chooses k random integers r^  for i = 1 to k 
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2. She calculates 
Ti = Vi^ M (mod n) for i = 1 to k 
And submit the k to Bob. 
3. Bob chooses an integer j randomly and asks Alice to show the values of r^  
for all i = 1 to k except j. 
4. Bob verifies if = ri^M (mod n) for z = 1 to A; except j. 
5. If the verification in (4) is passed, he signs on the unopened T / s and 
returns it to Alice. 
6. Alice unblinds T / by dividing T / with r j . 
7. A signature on M is obtained because: 
T / / r j 三(r/ . MY/rj 三 M" (mod n). 
The possibility of Alice being successful in cheating is 1/2^ since Bob choose 
j out of the k candidates randomly. 
2.8 The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) 
The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is proposed by Neil Koblitz [11] and 
Victor Miller [12] in 1985 independently. 
An elliptic curve is the set of solution (x,y) to an equation of the form: 
= + + 6 (mod p) (2.1) 
for two integers a and b, and p can be a prime number or 2" .^ 
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2.8.1 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Suppose P and Q are both points on the curve described by (2.1), then P + Q 
will always be another point on the curve [13]. xP represents the point P adding 
itself for x times. 
Suppose is a multiple of P, so that 
Q = xP 
for some x. Then the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is to determine 
X given P and Q. In fact, the security of ECC is based on the difficulty of the 
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. 
2.8.2 Cryptographic Applications Implemented by ECC 
The multiplication operation in ECC is an analogy to the modular exponentia-
tion. As mentioned in last section, the security of ECC is based on the difficulty 
of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Cryptographic applications such 
as key exchange algorithms, data encryption as well as digital signatures can be 
implemented with ECC. They are described in the following subsections. 
2.8.3 Analog of DifRe-Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm can be implemented by ECC in the 
following way: 
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Preparation 
1. Select the modulus p and the elliptic curve parameters a and b for the 
equation 
Ep{a, b)-.y"^ = + ax+ b (mod p) (2.2) 
2. Pick a generator point G on Ep{a,b) such that the smallest value n for 
which nC = O is a very large prime number. 
3. Ep(a,b) and G are the parameters of the cryptosystem known to all par-
ticipants. 
Key Exchange 
1. Alice selects an integer ua (less than n) as her private key. The corre-
sponding public key is Pa = uaG. 
2. Bob selects his private key nB and his public key Pb similarly. 
3. Alice obtains the secret key Khy calculating K = uaPb- Bob obtains K 
by calculating K = uaPb-
The secret key obtained by Alice and Bob are in fact the same key since 
UAPB = nAiriBG) = nB(nAG) = UAPB-
2.8.4 Data Encryption [11 
Suppose Alice wants to encrypt and send to Bob a message Pm using the elliptic 
curve Ep(a, b) defined in (2.2). Suppose Bob's private key and public key are ub 
‘ 16 
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and Pb = tibG respectively, where G is a point described above. The following 
steps are taken by Alice: 
1. The message M is mapped onto a point Pm on Ep�a, b). 
2. A random integer k is selected. 
3. Alice sends Bob the pair of points: 
{kPB,Pm-^k(nBPB))-
To decrypt the message, Bob multiplies the first point in the pair by ub and 
subtracts the result from the second point: 
Pm 
and obtain M by the inverse mapping of Pm-
2.8.5 The ECC Digital Signature 
The digital signature algorithms can also be implemented by elliptic curves. And 
it will be described in section 4.3. 
‘ 17 
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What is Money? 
The term electronic money was originated in Robert Hendrickson's The Cashless 
Society [14]. In his book, the pros and cons of electronic cash (in forms of 
credit card and electronic fund transfer) over traditional paper cash was widely 
discussed. However, the concept of currency that exists in format other then 
paper and coins has been expressed as early as 1888 in Edward Bellamy's book 
Looking Backward [15], in which cash was replaced by pasteboard and are hole-
punched at each transaction. 
In this chapter we give a description of the history as well as the properties 
of money. 
3.1 Money 
What is money? The following description is reference from an economist book 
Introduction to Money written by Honor Croome [16]: 
‘ 18 
Chapter 3 What is Money? 
Money is a store of 'liquid' value, a perfectly disposable asset. It 
is a medium of exchange, accepted by anyone in any transaction -
that is what constitutes its liquidity. Its existence makes possible the 
keeping of accurate and meaningful economic records and the making 
of economic estimates; that it is constitutes a unit of account 
When we talk about electronic money, we are referring to the substitution of 
money by any electronic formats. Examples of electronic money include credit 
cards and electronic checks. Electronic cash and micropayment are more specif-
ically, the electronic analogy of cash. We are going to talk about their example 
in the following sections. 
3.1.1 The History of Money [17； 
In the early days of human history when money is not yet invented, people 
practiced barter: the direct exchange of goods and services for other goods 
and services. However, this transaction method requires a double coincidence 
of wants. Therefore, such practice is replaced by the usage of various forms of 
money. 
The earliest money was the commodity money. It is an item that is accepted 
in trade. These physical commodities which was used as a medium of exchange 
include seashells, beads, tea, fish hooks, fur, cattle and even tobacco. 
Later expensive metals such as silver and gold were used as money. This 
added portability to the money. In 2500 BC the Egyptians produced metal rings 
and used them as money. By 700 BC, a group of seafaring people called the 
Lydians became the first in the Western world to make coins. During the 18th 
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century, coins became popular throughout Europe as trading grew. However, 
the coins make by silver and gold are still belong to the group of commodity 
money because they hold actual value. 
In modern monetary systems, the essential feature of any medium in which 
payments are made is not the intrinsic value, but the general acceptability. The 
appearance of representative money further enhanced the portability of money. 
Representative money is tokens or pieces of paper that are not intrinsically valu-
able themselves, but can be exchanged for a specific commodity. Fiat money is 
similar to representative money except that it cannot be redeemed for a com-
modity. The notes we use today are an example of fiat money. 
As technology advances and more convenience is desired, electronic money 
begin to eliminate part of the physical cash as a transaction medium. Credit 
cards were introduced in the fifties and it is widely used in the world today. And 
a new form of money: electronic cash was developed in the nineties. Electronic 
cash enable Internet and wireless payments, which enhances the conduction of 
electronic commerce. 
3.1.2 Functions of Money 
In his book A History Money [18], Davies, Glyn presents the following definition 
for money: 
Money is anything that is widely used for making payments and ac-
counting for debts and credits. 
According to [18], there are general and specific functions of money. The 
general functions of money include: 
‘ 20 
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1. As the liquid asset. 
2. As a framework of the market allocation system, that is, the prices for 
goods and services. 
3. As a causative factor in the economy. 
4. As the controller of the economy. 
The general functions of money are mostly macro-economic. There are also 
specific functions of money, which include the Mowings: 
1. As a unit of account. 
2. As a common measure of value. 
3. As a medium of exchange. 
4. As means of payment. 
5. As a standard for deferred payments. 
6. As a store of value. 
The specific functions of money are mostly micro-economic. 
Not every commodity used as money can achieve all the general and specific 
functions listed above. Furthermore, the functions of any particular form of 
money may change over time. Therefore, when a new form of money is devel-
oped, it is necessary for the society to consider if this new money can possess as 
many functions as listed. 
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3.2 Existing Payment Systems 
Nowadays, the method of transaction settlements is not limited to the usage 
of coins and notes. Yet, payment by cash is the simplest form of payment. 
However, depends on the nature of payments, many different alternatives are 
used. 
3.2.1 Cash Payments 
Cash refers to coins and bank notes. Payment by cash is the simplest form of 
payment. It is easily transferable from one individual to another. And it is 
suitable for payments of small amount because there is no transaction charges 
levied. It is also anonymous because no audit trail is left behind. 
However, there is some weakness of cash. For example, it is not portable 
when a large amount of cash is to be handled. Also, such large amount of 
cash has to be transferred with a very high level of security, thus results in a 
high handling cost. Also, the problem of counterfeits becomes more severe as 
photocopying technology advances. 
3.2.2 Payment through Banks 
Suppose Alice, who keeps her money in Bank A need to pay Bob, who has 
an account in Bank B for a certain sum of money. It may not be efficient for 
Alice to withdraw the money from Bank A and pass to Bob, who deposits it 
back in Bank B. Therefore, some other payment methods other than payment 
by cash are employed. These methods include payment by check, payment by 
giro or credit transfer, automated clearing house {ACE) payments and also the 
\ 
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wire transfer services. They are categorized as payment through banks since the 
banks are involved. 
3.2.3 Using Payment Cards 
In 1947, the Flatbush National Bank issued cards to its local customers. In 1950, 
the first charge card, Travel and Entertainment was issued by the Diners Club. 
Nowadays, there are two major companies, VISA International and Mastercard 
makes up a large number of member banks. 
Traditionally, there are two kinds of card payment systems: the credit card 
payment systems and the debit card payment systems. 
In credit card payment systems, the card-issuing banks register the card-
holder, produce a card incorporating and the card association's logo, and operate 
a card account to which payments are charged. The merchants need to register 
to the banks too. When a cardholder purchases in a registered merchant, a sales 
voucher containing the payer's card number, the amount of the payment, the 
date and a good description. At the end of the day, the merchant presents the 
vouchers to the bank where the payments are cleared. The merchant's account 
is credited while the cardholder's account is debited. 
The debit card payment systems ars similar, but the transaction clear-
ance is done real time. That is, at the time the transaction takes place, the 
amount is transferred from the customer to the merchant bank account. 
In the recently years, smart card technology develops rapidly and smart cards 





Electronic cash was the digital analogy of cash. The classical electronic cash 
protocol was proposed by David Chaum et al. in [19]. It is the first electronic 
cash protocol that can truly implement the features of paper cash. 
4.1 The Basic Requirements 
Since electronic cash is a digital implementation of paper cash, its requirements 
are very similar to those of paper cash. 
According to [20], an ideal cash payment system should possess the following 
requirements: 
1. Independence 
The security of electronic cash can only depend on itself, it cannot depend 
on any physical condition. 
2. Security 
The cash can neither be copied, forged or double spent. 
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3. Privacy 
User privacy should be protected. No one should be able to trace the 
relationship between a user and his purchases. In the other words, user 
anonymity should be provided. This requirement is also referred as the 
untraceability requirement. 
4. Off-line payment During a transaction, the only parties involved are 
the payer and the payee. No customer-bank or merchant-bank on-line 
connection is required. 
5. Transferability 
The cash can be transferred from one user to another. 
6. Divisibility The piece of cash can be subdivided into arbitrary pieces of 
smaller values so that the value of all pieces is equivalent to the value of 
the undivided piece of cash. 
To achieve the above requirements, cryptographic algorithms such as blind 
signature, zero-knowledge proofs and public-key signatures are employed. We 
describe the basic electronic cash model in next subsection. 
4.2 Basic Model of Electronic Cash 
In this section, we describe the basic model of electronic cash proposed in [19 . 
19] is chosen because it is a significant paper in the history of electronic cash 
and the three applications in this thesis: Micropayment Tickets, Anonymous 
Electronic Voting as well as Anonymous Internet Access are motivated by this 
paper. 
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In [19], a electronic coin exists in the format of 
(mod n)) 
where the first term represents the money and the second term is the bank's 
signature on the money. 
We describe how Alice who has an account in an electronic cash issuing bank 
withdraws electronic coins and spend it in the merchant Bob. Let the private 
key and public key of the bank be d and e respectively, and n is the published 
composite in the public key cryptosystem. 
4.2.1 Basic Protocol 
We firstly present the basic electronic cash protocol. Where a modified version 
is given later. 
1. Alice chooses two random numbers x and r. And presents 
T = f(x) (mod n) 
to the bank. 
2. The bank returns 
T^ =(产.f{x)Y (mod n) 
that is 
(r • f{x)y (mod n) 
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to Alice and withdraws the equivalent amount of dollar from Alice's ac-
count. Notice that e . d 三 1 (mod as explained in chapter 2. 
3. Alice removes the blinding factor r from T^ and form 
if(x)Y (mod n) 
which is the bank's signature on x. 
4. Alice can then form the electronic coin 
C = (x J(xy/^ (mod n)) 
5. To spend one electronic coin in Bob's shop, Alice pays Bob C. Bob contacts 
the bank immediately and verifies if the coin has been deposited before. 
If not, Bob redeems the coin and his account is credited. 
4.2.2 Modified Protocol 
The basic protocol above illustrates a simplified electronic cash model. However, 
modifications are required because Alice's anonymity is protected uncondition-
ally, which is unfair to the merchants. Alice may double spend without penalty. 
Also, it is an on-line system which requires more resources. In [19], modifica-
tions are made so that the system is off-line and only conditional anonymity is 
provided to Alice. In this way, double spending is prevented. 
The modified electronic cash protocol consists of three phases, namely 
1. The cash withdrawal phase 
2. The spending phase 
3. The redeeming phase 
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Cash Withdrawal 
Assume Alice has a bank account numbered u and the bank records an associated 
counter v. To withdraw a coin from the bank, the following procedures are 
undergone: 
1. Alice forms and sends k TVs in the following manner: 
Ti = rf • f{x i ,y i ) (mod n) 
where 
i = 1 to k 
Xi = giai,Ci) 
and 
yi = 一 II + 
where 0 denotes bitwise exclusive OR and || denotes concatenation. 
2. The bank chooses randomly a set of k/2 integers, R = {ij}, where 1 < 
ij < k and 1 < j < k/2. and asks Alice to show the values of ai, q and 
di for every i in R. 
3. The bank compares the k/2 presented T '^s and see if they can be derived 
from these r^, ai, Ci, di, u and v. 
4. The bank gives Alice 
n T / / 3 (mod n) 
i^R 
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and withdraws an equivalent amount of money from Alice's account. The 
value of the counter is also increased from v to iH-1. 
5. Alice removes the blinding factor and form 
(mod n) 
which is corresponding to the bank's blind signature on the electronic coin 
C = n f (工i,yi) (mod n ) . 
i^R 
Alice also reiiidexes the candidates in C in a lexicographic sense such that: 
KxuVl) < f{X2,y2) < •••f{Xk/2,yk/2)-
she saves the electronic coin and also increases her copy of the counter by 1. 
The Spending Phase 
To spend one coin in Bob's shop, the following procedures are run: 
1. Alice sends Bob the coin C. 
2. Bob generates a /i;/2-bit binary random challenge vector z = [zi^ 2 2 , 2 ^ / 2 ) 
and sends it to Alice. 
3. Alice responds according to the following rule: 
-when Zi = Alice sends Bob a^, Q and yi\ 
-when Zi = 0, Alice sends Bob Xj, a^  0 ( u || (v + i)) and di. 
4. Bob verifies that C can be derived from these partial openings presented 
by Alice. 
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The redeeming phase 
Bob sends C along with the partial openings to Alice's bank and his account is 
credited. 
The bank also stores C, together with z and the corresponding partial open-
ings. 
The modified protocol supports an off-line payment system because Bob need 
not to contact the bank immediately after receiving Alice's payment. 
4.2.3 Double Spending Prevention 
In the modified version of electronic cash protocol, double spending is prevented. 
This is because if Alice spends a same coin at two different merchants, two 
random challenges on her coin will be executed. Suppose she spends the coin 
firstly at M! and then at M � , e a c h generates the random challenge vectors zi 
and Z2, where: 
zi = (zu.zi^,…，〜2) 
” Z2 =(勿1,勿2，…，勿fe/2) 
When M2 redeems the coin, the bank will discover that Ailce double spent. 
Suppose Zi- + the bank will receive the following partial openings: 
(h,Ci,yi and 
Xi,ai II {v + i)),di 
and Alice's account number u will be revoked since 
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di e(ai II (v + i))) = (u II {v + i)) 
and the bank has knowledge on once u is known. 
The chance of Alice being undetected in a double spending is 
4.3 Examples of Electronic Cash 
There are several examples of electronic cash that come into real applications. 
We describe them briefly in this section. 
4.3.1 eCash 
eCash [19] is founded by David Chaum et al and its protocol is described in 
details in last section. It is now sold to the eCash Technologies [22], an US 
based company. Advanced electronic cash technologies such as person-to-person 
electronic payments and mobile electronic cash are being developed. eCash is a 
tokenized cash system because the coin represents actual monetary value. 
4.3.2 CAFE 
C A F E (Conditional Access for Europe) was a project funded under the 
European Community's ESPRIT program [23], [24]. The CAFE protocol is 
based on the idea of the untraceable electronic payment protocol proposed by 
David Chaum in [25] and the concept of checks with counters [26]. It is a hybrid 
scheme in which it offers all the benefits of anonymous electronic cash but at the 
same time allows the users to sign up checks up to a specified amount. Strong 
cryptographic techniques and temper-resistant devices are used so that all the 
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payment transactions are protected. 
4.3.3 NetCash 
Netcash [27] is a framework supporting anonymous real-time electronic pay-
ment systems over an opened network. It provides scalability and acceptability 
with weaker anonymity and only a limited form of offline-operation. Moreover, 
according to [27], it integrates anonymous electronic currency into the global 
banking and accounting infrastructure. 
In the NetCash system, there are several currency servers. A user buys 
electornic coins from these currency servers and spends it in a merchant. The 
merchant checks from the currency servers whether the electronic coins are re-
deemed before. An unredeemed electornic coin can circulate until it is redeemed 
at the currency servers. 
4.3.4 CyberCash 
CyberCash [28] is an on-line cash-like system. The system is designed for those 
payments where the value is too low to be paid by credit cash transactions. 
Customers buy CyberCoin cash from the CyberCash server, and the amount is 
charged to their credit cards or bank accounts. The cash is then stored in a 
CyberCash wallet, which is a piece of software resides on the customer's side. 
In CyberCash system, the electronic coin metaphor is a lot weaker then the 
tokenized systems such as eCash. An account is established with the Cyber-
Cash server when a customer buys CyberCoin cash. To make a payment is 
actually similar to authorizing a transaction of an amount from one account to 
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another. Public-key cryptography is used when loading a CyberCash wallet, 
while symmetric key is used during CyberCoin transaction. 
4.3.5 Mondex 
The Mondex electronic cash card [3] is referred as a prepayment card. There are 
very little publicity about the Mondex transaction algorithm. According to [3], 
the Mondex electronic cash system operates on a smart card which stores value 
on a microchip. Complex security systems are used when value is transferred 
between chips. 
The Mondex Card is a smart card with a small microcomputer chip embedded 
in it, which acts as an electronic purse. The electronic purse can be loaded with 
value, and the value is stored inside the smart card until it is used as payment 
for goods or services, or transferred to another Mondex Card. Payments are 
done by inserting the Card into a card reader. The electronic purse can also be 
locked using a personal code so that only the Card's owner can access the value 
on it. 
4.4 Limitations of Electronic Cash 
Since electronic cash carries monetary value, it should be very carefully de-
signed. Therefore the security requirements are strict and the computational 
effort required is high. Similar to credit card payments, the cost of transac-
tion of electronic cash becomes significant when the amount involved is low. 
Therefore electronic cash is not suitable for low-value transactions. 
Because of the above reason, payment protocols that are suitable for low 
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amount transactions are designed. They are referred as micropayment protocols. 




In electronic cash protocols, a significant amount of public-key cryptosysteins 
is employed. This makes them secure but at the same time also increase the 
transaction cost. As we enter into the digital age, new electronic commerce 
applications are developed and there are new requirements for payments. For 
example, the payment for an on-line stock quote as well as the payment for 
viewing an article on web. Therefore, an efficient digital payment system that 
can support the payment of a very small value is needed. 
Micropayments are electronic payments of small amount, which can be as 
little as a penny. Since the amount involved is small, both high computational 
and storage efficiencies are required so that the transaction cost becomes in-
significant. This can be achieved by giving up some of the security requirements 
such as user anonymity; or making the payment low-value itself such that the 
cost of counterfeiting is higher than the micropayment itself. 
In order to distinguish from the micropayment schemes discuss this chapter, 
we refer the electronic cash schemes mentioned in last chapter as macropayment 
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schemes. 
5.1 Basic Model of Micropayments 
Exceptional efficiency is required in order to support micropayments. For ex-
ample, in [29], hash operations are used to minimize the number of public-key 
operations. According to [29], a hash function evaluation is about 100 times 
faster than RSA signature verification, and is about 10,000 times faster than 
RSA signature generation. Therefore hash functions are usually employed in 
micropayment schemes. Table 5.1 gives a comparison between the computa-
tional speed of hash functions and the other operations. 
Operation Number per second 
One-way hash function evaluation 20000 
Public-key signature 2 
Public-key signature verification 200 
Network connection 1000 
Table 5.1: Comparison of Computational Speed of Hash Functions Evaluation 
against other Operations 
Similar to electronic cash, three parties are involved in a micropayment 
model, namely the broker, the user and the vendor: 
1. User: the customer who obtains goods and services by paying with mi-
cropayments 
2. Broker: miriter of micropayments 
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3. Vendor: the merchant who provides goods and services in exchange for 
micropayments 
5.1.1 Micropayments generation 
There are two ways to generate the micropayments: either generated by the 
brokers or generated by the customer. 
Generated by the brokers 
In this method, the broker mints micropayments. And customers buy micro-
payments from the brokers with any other macropayment methods. A return 
policy is also required so that the customers can return any unused or expired 
micropayments. Such scheme is a debit-based scheme since the customer has to 
pay before they obtain the good and services. 
Generated by the customer 
In this method, a certified customer generates the micropayments by himself 
and spends them in he vendors. His account will be debited when the vendors 
redeem the micropayments at his bank. This scheme is credit-based because the 
customer can spend before he actually pays. 
5.1.2 Spending 
Unlike the macropayment schemes, secure one-way hash functions, instead of 
public-key signatures, are used in the micropayment schemes. A micropayment 
chain, or the stack of coins Mhas the following format (Assume the stack consists 
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of 100 coins): 
M = � N, f • 机 SigniC,广糊 
where Sign denotes the signature of the coin issuer and C denotes the certificate 
of the stack owner. f(.) is a secure one-way hash function,尸+i(a:) = /^( / (x)) , 
f i x ) = X. 
To spend i coins from an unspent chain, the customer sends the following to 
the vendor: 
( f [ N ) , f - i [ N ) , S i g n � C , f _ [ N ) , i ) 
The vendor verifies if = /—(AO，as well as other information. 
Upon successful verification, the vendor accepts the payment. The unspent stack 
is either return to the broker or authorized by the vendor. 
Double spending is a common problem in all electronic payment schemes, 
including both macro- and micropayments. Different measures are used in dif-
ferent schemes to prevent double spending. Usually a database is used to lookup 
all payment protocols so that the double spender is detected. In this way double 
spending is deterred. 
5.1.3 Redemption 
In micropayment schemes, an offline redemption process is required because of 
the computational power consideration. That is, the vendors verify and redeem 
the micropayment collected later in the end of the day. A record of redeemed 
micropayments is kept in the database of the broker so as to make sure that the 
micropayments are only redeemed once. 
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5.2 Examples of Micropayments 
Micropayment protocols are developed since mid nineties. In this section, we 
describe three representative micropayment schemes. Namely the Pay word [29], 
MicroMint[29] and Millicents[30:. 
5.2.1 PayWord 
Pay Word is a credit-based micropayment scheme. It uses chains of hash values 
described in section 5.1.2 to represent customer credit within the system. 
The pay words are generated by the customers. A customer picks up a random 
number Wn as the n 仇 pay word. It is also used as the seed for generating the 
rest of the pay word chain in the following way: 
Wi_i = h(wi) where z = 1 to n 
and h(.) is a secure one-way collision resistant hash function. The zeroth value, 
Wo is called the root of the chain and is included in the commitment M, where 
M = Signbroker(川 Q, vendor, customer, date, other information). 
As indicated from M, the payword chain is bounded to a particular customer-
vendor relationship by the above commitment. That is, the customer can only 
spend the chain in a specific vendor once the commitment is signed. 
To make a payment, the customer sends 
P = i'Wi.i) 
along with the commitment M to the vendor. The vendor verifies if Wi equals 
h^iwo). If so, it accepts the payment. It also records Wi in a database as a mark 
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of the last spent pay word. The unfurnished payword chain can be used again 
later. While P' = (Wi+k, k) will be sent when the customer spends the next k 
coins. 
When a vendor redeems the coins, the last payword and the customer's 
commitment are sent to the broker. Upon successful verification, the vendor's 
account is credited while at the same time the customer's account is debited. 
5.2.2 MicroMint 
MicroMiiit is proposed at the same time as Pay Word [29]. It is debit-based to 
the customers and the broker, but credit-based to the vendors. Its security relies 
on the difficulty to produce the coins without special cryptographic hardware 
resides at the broker's side. The MicroMint coins are produced by the broker, 
which are sold to the users who spend the coins at the vendors in exchange for 
goods and services. The vendors redeem the coins at the broker later. 
The coins in the MicroMint protocol are specially designed. It requires high 
generation cost unless the coins are generated in bulk. Special cryptographic 
hardware is used and economy of scale is achieved at the broker side. 
The MicroMint coins are way-collision tuples ( x i , . . . ,Xk), where the x^'s 
are distinct and 
h(xi) = h{x2)=…=h(xk) = y 
for some number y. [29] gives an efficiency analysis in producing the coins. 
How the coins are spent, verified and redeemed are similar to other electronic 
payment protocols. 
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5.2.3 Millicent 
Millicent is developed by Digital Equipment Corporation in 1995 [30]. It is 
designed for the payment as low as at tenth of a cent. It is a debit-based system 
and the Millicent coins are called script 
Millicent is a decentralized system. The vendors issue scripts while the broker 
buys these scripts from the vendors in bulk. Before a customer purchases goods 
and services from the vendors, he buys the corresponding scripts from the broker. 
To make a payment, the followings are sent from the customer to the vendor: 
{scriptyendor, request, H(scriptyendor, request, CSKY) 
where CSK is the customer shared key which is unique for every customer. H(.) 
is a one-way hash function. To prevent double spending. The vendor checks 
the database to see if the script is spent before. When necessary, a change 
script'戮—will be given back to the customer. 
There is no redemption in Millicent because the vendors are paid already 
when the broker buys the scripts. A multiple brokers environment is also support 
30:. 
5.3 Limitations of Micropayments 
Micropayments are specially designed for making transactions of low values. 
Because of its functions, micropayment protocols are efficient in terms of com-
putational power and storage requirement. However, in order to achieve these 
efficiencies, the security requirements are loosen. 
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While macropayment systems are on-line and they are more concerned with 
authenticity and privacy. Some relatively complicated cryptographic algorithms 
such as public key signature as well as zero-knowledge proof of identity are 
involved. Micropayment protocols, on the other hand, use simpler algorithms 
such as symmetric encryption and hash functions to achieve a limited security. 
However, if the micropayment protocol is carefully designed, adequate security 
can also be supported. For example, in Chapter 6 we introduced the Anonymous 
Micropayment Ticket, which is a micropayments scheme with conditional user 
anonymity. 
5.4 Digital Money - More than a Medium of 
Transaction 
In Chapter 4 and 5, we have introduced a number of digital money protocols, 
which are constructed from different combinations of cryptographic primitives. 
Based on these existing digital money protocols, new applications such as elec-
tronic voting systems [31] [32], anonymity services provision [33] [34] as well as 
electronic auction systems [35] are developed. 
In this thesis, three cryptographic applications are developed based on the 
electronic cash protocols. Namely: 
Anonymous Micropayment Tickets 
This is an anonymous micropayment protocol. Traditional micropayment pro-
tocols give up user anonymity for computational efficiency [29] [30]. Our proto-
col introduces a new concept of payment tickets, which can be considered as a 
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reusable electronic coin. With the employment of elliptic curve digital signatures 
36], double spending is prevented. The system will be explained in Chapter 6. 
Non-transferable Electronic Voting Pass 
The security requirements in an electronic voting system are similar to those in 
electronic cash systems. In an electronic voting system, each legitimate voter is 
given a 1 dollar electronic coin and they use the electornic coin to 'buy' their 
preferred candidates during the polling period. After the polling period, the 
candidate who gets most coins wins. Similar to the electronic cash systems, 
desirable properties such as voter anonymity and double-voting prevention are 
achieved. 
In this thesis, a receipt-free electronic voting system is proposed. In our 
proposal, we have modified the coin-withdrawal algorithm in the electrnic cash 
protocol and achieved the non-transferability of voting right. This protocol will 
be described in Chapter 7. 
Anonymous Internet Access 
When one accesses to the Internet via an Internet services provider (ISP), infor-
mation such as when and how long one has accessed the modem pool and which 
objects one has requested is logged in the proxy servers. Such data enables 
one's user habit to be traced and analyzed. This is referred as 'clicktrails' data 
collections and is a threat to user privacy. 
In this thesis, we proposed an anonymous Internet access service solution, 
which is based on cryptographic techniques. We have modified the electronic 
cash protocol in [19]. This solution enables the provision of Internet user 
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anonymity and the problem of 'clicktrails' data collection can be prevented. 






Electronic commerce has already become part of our daily life, in which the na-
ture of business activities varies from ordering of physical goods to subscription 
of information. To support the transactions involve in the digital economy, two 
main types of electronic payment schemes: macropayments and micropayments 
are developed. As explained in chapter 4 and chapter 5, the former is for trans-
actions of a larger sum of money, while the later is for transferring a smaller 
amount. 
Since the amount of money involved in micropayment systems is small, in 
order to be cost effective, such systems need to be more efficient and lighter 
in weight when compare to the rnacropayment systems. In this chapter, we 
present an off-line credit based micropayment ticket, which can be used for 
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more than once. Also, the ticket is rion vendor-specific, that is, a user can use 
the same ticket in different vendors. Moreover, our system supports conditional 
anonymity and we utilize a special feature of the elliptic curve digital signature 
so that the user identity is revealed when double spending occurs. 
We firstly give a verbal description of the real life analogy of our system in 
section 2, followed by a review on elliptic curve digital signature in section 3. 
After that we will give a detailed description of the protocol in section 4, which 
is the cryptographic implementation for concepts introduced in section 2. In 
section 5 we will analyze on the security of our system. Efficiency analysis will 
be done in section 6. 
6.2 Overview of the Systems 
In this section, we give a real life analogy of the proposed system. Four parties 
are involved here, namely the user who purchases goods and services, the vendors 
who supply goods and services, the broker who mints micropayment tickets, and 
a TTP (trusted third party) that holds information about user identity. Both 
the user and the vendors are registered to the broker. 
In our system, the user firstly obtains an anonymous certificate from the 
TTP. After that he/she opens an account in the broker with the anonymous 
certificate and buys micropayment tickets from the broker, which has the format 
shown in Figure 6.1. 
The ticket consists of a table of 100 slots (this number is only for illustration 
and is arbitrary). It also contains some other information such as its serial num-
ber, the broker's signature as well as optional fields such as the value represented 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
Serial number 
Broker's signature 
Other information ... 
Figure 6.1: The micropayment ticket 
by each slot and the expired date of the tickets etc. 
To make a payment, the user presents his/her ticket to the vendor, after 
verification, the vendor records down the serial number of the ticket. It also 
crosses out x unmarked slots (where x equals amount of payment divided by the 
value each slot represents), starting with the smallest slot number and records 
down which slots it has crossed out. The ticket is then returned to the user. 
After this the user can use it at another vendor so long as the ticket has not 
been used up or expired. 
To redeem the received payment, the vendor presents the information it 
recorded from the user to the broker. The broker checks if the corresponding 
slots on the ticket have been redeemed before. Upon satisfactory validation, the 
vendor's account is credited. 
Since the ticket doesn't contain user information and is bought from the 
broker anonymously, our system is anonymous. That is, the broker cannot 
relate the identity of the user to the vendors whom he/she has been transacted, 
nor the vendor can derive the identity from the ticket. However, the anonymity 
provided in our protocol is conditional, in which the user identity is revealed 
when double spending occurs. This can be achieved by special feature of the 
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elliptic curve digital signature, which will be explained in next section. 
6.3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Since elliptic curve digital signature is a one-time signature and is defined in the 
IEEE standard [36], it is employed in our protocol to prevent double spending. 
Here we give a brief review of the signature scheme. 
Firstly select a value q such that g is a prime number or g = where m 
is a prime number. Also select an elliptic curve E{Fq) over Fq (as described by 
Equation 2.1) and choose a point G of a prime order r in E(Fg). Next select a 
random s as the signer's private key, such that 0 < s < r. The corresponding 
public key is Vl^  = sG. 
Before signing a message, a one-time key pair (u,V = uG) is generated. 
Denote the point Fas {xy, ？/„). The signature of a message m, where 0 < m < r , 
is a pair of integers (c, d). Where 
c = Xy (mod r) (6.1) 
d = u—i(jn + sc) (mod r) (6.2) 
To verify the signature, one computes P = md'^G + cd~^W. Denote P as 
(xp, Up) and the signature is valid if Xp = c (mod r). 
The one-time key pair (u, U = uG) should be selected for every signature. 
Otherwise, the signer's private key can be recovered easily. For two message mi 
and 7712 signing with same u, the corresponding di and d] are given by: 
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di = + sc) (mod r) (6.3) 
6,2 = + sc) (mod r) (6.4) 
Prom (6.3) and (6.4)，u is recovered by 
u = (mi - 7X12)1 {di - c y (mod r) (6.5) 
Once u is known, the private key s can be recovered by 
s = {diu - mi ) /c (mod r). 
In our protocol, payment is made by signing with the one-time key pair. 
Double spending is prevented because the private key is revealed when one uses 
the one-time key pair twice. 
6.4 The Micropayment Ticket Protocol 
In this section, we describe the cryptographic implementation of the micro-
payment tickets. Before Alice opens an account in the broker, she obtains an 
anonymous certificate Cert from the TTP: 
Cert = SigriTTPsignipseudo, public key, expiry date) 
where pseudo is the pseudonym of Alice. The TTP can relate pseudo to Alice 
but it reveals pseudo's identity only when one can present the private key of 
pseudo. This condition has also been employed in the anonymous micropayment 
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system in [37]. However, it is not necessary for the TTP to know Alice's private 
key. When double spending occurs, this private key is revealed. Therefore the 
anonymity provided by the micropayment ticket is conditional. 
With the anonymous certificate, Alice can opens an account in the broker 
using the name pseudo. She can obtain micropayment tickets from the broker. 
The payment can be made by any anonymous payment methods. Our system 
is credit based, where the account is debited only when the vendors redeem the 
payments. 
6.4.1 The Micropayment Ticket 
In this subsection we describe the actual structure of the micropayment ticket. A 
pay word chain [29] is included in each ticket T. This chain consists ofwo,wi,wm 
where Wi = h{wi + 1) and h(.) is a one-way hash function. Alice obtains Tfrom 
the broker, where 
T = S ign Broker sign (^0 j ^ 1, • • •, 00, pseudo, pubHc key, expiry date). 
Along with the unused ticket, the broker also sends a spending token Sq to 
Alice, where 
So = SignBrokersign(co,WQ). 
S is an indicator on the status of the ticket. The first term CQ is the 
coordinate of Uq (mod r) in the one-time key pair (uo, Uq) chosen by Alice, 
while the second term is the last payword spent {wq in this case). Notice that uq 
cannot be derived from Uq. Also notice that Alice is anonymous to the broker 
and she can bought more than one ticket with the same account. 
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6.4.2 Payment 
When pseudo (i.e. Alice) makes a payment to the first vendor Vi. Suppose she 
pays for a value worth n slots, she presents 
Pi = (T, Sigupseudosignispending information), So, Cert) 
to Vi. The term spending information contains information that will be pre-
sented to the broker when the vendor redeems the payment, such as the first 
and the last slot numbers that involved in this payment (which is 1 and n in this 
case), the name of the vendor, time of transaction etc. The signature pseudo 
sign is an elliptic curve digital signature as described in last section, using the 
one-time key which is authorized by the broker who signed on Sq. 
When Vi receives A , it reads cq and Wq from Sq. Next it verifies the signature 
on spending information with the public key shown on Cert. It also checks if the 
paywords on the ticket are valid by applying a hash function on the Wn n times 
and see if the result equals Wq. After this it saves T, SigUpseudosignispending 
information), as well as Sq for future redeeming. It also returns 
S\ = Signvisign(ci,'Wi, spending information) 
to pseudo, where ci is corresponding to the new one-time key pair chosen by 
pseudo and Wi is the last payword spent. This is the cryptographic analogy of 
the process of validating the ticket and crossing out the spent slot on it. 
In general, pseudo presents 
Pi = (T, Signpseudosign(i^^ spending information), Si-i,Cert) 
to the i仇 vendor, where Si^i is the spending token signed by the { i - i y ^ vendor. 
In fact, it is not necessary for pseudo to send the entire ticket to the vendor. For 
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example, instead of showing all the values of wo to wioo, only the last payword 
in the payment chain are required. 
6.4.3 Redemption 
The vendor redeems pseudo's payment by presenting T, SigUpseudosign(spending 
information) and the spending token S to the broker. After verifying on the 
signature of pseudo, and knowing that the chain of redeeming paywords on 
the ticket are not redeemed before, the broker pays the vendor according to 
the amount listed in spending information. The account of pseudo will also be 
debited accordingly. Notice that the redemption of payword chains need not be 
in sequence. 
6.4.4 Double Spending 
Alice cannot spend a new chain of paywords without the spending tokens which 
marked the slot number of last spent payword. Therefore, if Alice double spends, 
she can only begin with those paywords which immediately after the end of any 
previously spent chains. This means that she has to use the same one-time key 
pair to sign on two different spending information, which are unique for every 
payment. Prom the explanation in section 3, her secret key can be recovered, 
and her identity is revealed by the TTP. 
6.5 Security Analysis 
In this section we analyze on the security of the anonymous micropayment ticket. 
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6.5.1 Conditional Anonymity 
Anonymity is provided in our system. If the user doesn't double spend, the 
broker doesn't have information on the user's identity and the vendors cannot 
derive the user identity from the tickets. In this way, user privacy is protected. 
However, the anonymity cannot be abused because it is conditional and the 
user's identity is revealed when one double spends. 
6.5.2 Lost Tickets 
Only the owner of the ticket is able to spend the pay words on it. This is because 
every payment requires a signature of the ticket owner. The ticket owner bears 
no risk when he loses a ticket because the unused paywords cannot be spent by 
other people. 
6.5.3 Double Spending 
Double spending is prevented because the user's identity is revealed once the 
vendor redeems a double spent slot. 
6.5.4 Collusion with Vendors 
The user may cheat with a dishonest vendor by asking the vendor to sign on a 
false spending token. However this action can be detected easily when later the 
vendors redeem the payments. 
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Case 1 
Suppose the following chains of payments which is shown in Figure 6.2 are re-
deemed, where the shaded part represents a forge chain resulted by the spending 
token signed by the dishonest vendor: 
22 M  
I I I I iH � … 
0 10 16 30 50 
Figure 6.2: Double spending resulted from a forge spending token 
This can be easily detected because the broker only trusts on the sequence 
of consecutive chains with which the first chain begins with wq. This is because 
it must trust on the signer of So, that is the broker itself. In this way, the signer 
of the forge spending token is discovered easily. 
Case 2 
The dishonest vendor may also sign on a spending token that contains a valid 
yJi (that is i equals a value at the end of a valid chain) and a new c, such that 
the user can use the pay words with slot number after i + 1 twice. However they 
cannot success in cheating because when later the two vendors redeem the chains 
that both start with slot number z + 1, two spending tokens both authorize slot 
number i + 1 will be presented, which implies one of the spending tokens is forge. 
The dishonest vendor will be discovered because it is not the redeemer of the 
preceding chain. 
Notice that the sequence of redemption of pay word chains doesn't affect the 
ability of distinguishing dishonest vendors. 
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Traceable Consumption Habit 
In our system, the vendors know the preceding vendors where a user has visited, 
so they can obtain limited information about the consumption habit of their cus-
tomers. However it requires the collusion of a large number of vendors in order 
to trace the consumption habit of a user. Moreover, our system is anonymous 
in nature, if the user does not reveal his/her identity to the vendors, he/she still 
remains anonymous in the system under normal conditions. In this way his/her 
consumption habit cannot be traced. 
6.6 Efficiency Analysis 
The efficiency of our system relies on the repeating usage of a same micropay-
ment ticket, which save much computation effort for generating new electronic 
coins. In this section we discuss the efforts by the TTP, the user, vendors and 
the broker. 
The TTP's role in our system is a certification authority. It is responsible 
for issuing anonymous certificates and managing a secure database that holds 
the files about user identity. When in case of double spending, it needs to verify 
on the presented public-private key pair and reveals the user's identity when 
necessary. 
The user needs to apply for an anonymous certificate and open an account 
in the broker. For each payment, an elliptic curve signature is made and the 
next one-time key pair is generated. He/she also needs to verify the vendor's 
signature on the new spending token. 
A vendor needs to register to the broker. During each transaction, it needs 
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to verify three signatures (the broker's signature on the ticket, the previous 
vendor's signature on the spending token as well as the user's signature on the 
spending information) and check the validity of the paywords by performing a 
hashing n times. It also needs to sign on the spending token at the end of each 
transaction. 
The brokers need to maintain the anonymous accounts and issuing micropay-
ment tickets. When a vendor redeems the payments, the broker needs to verify 
the signature on the spending token, as well as that on the spending information. 
It checks if cheats occur and takes suitable actions when necessary. 
6.7 Conclusion 
To conclude, the anonymous micropayment ticket is a electronic payment that 
supports conditional anonymity, which is very important to user privacy but 
often being given up in micropayment systems. It is efficient and off-line. More-
over, the users are only liable to the payments spent with their signatures. 
Double spending is also prevented by the employment of elliptic curve digital 
signatures, which is well defined in the standard. 
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Anonymous Electronic Voting 
Systems 
7.1 Introduction 
Since the first proposal of the cryptographic voting protocol in 1981 [38]，a 
number of researches have been done on the electronic voting systems. Like 
many digital services, electronic voting brings much convenience to the society 
and lowers the cost of traditional elections. However, the systems must be 
supported by very strong security services in order to be fair and accepted by 
the general public. Efficiency is also an important factor for a practical system. 
The definition of a secure voting system is given in [39], in which seven 
requirements namely completeness, soundness, privacy, uiireusability, eligibility, 
fairness and verifiability are listed. However most of the early electronic voting 
schemes are not receipt-free. The receipt generated by the election administrator 
can be used as an evidence of having made a particular vote and therefore enables 
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one to sell his vote to the others. This problem induced the concept of receipt-
freeriess in an electronic voting system. Such a concept, which is firstly proposed 
in [40] is regarded as a milestone in electronic voting protocol design. A number 
of receipt-free electronic voting schemes have been proposed in which the receipts 
were eliminated by different means. In [40] and [41], physical assumptions are 
made so that receipt-freeness is achieved. While in [31], [42], [43] and [44], the 
authentication and voting processes are separated. A piece of authentication 
document is generated with which the voter can vote anonymously. However, 
we find out that in these systems, the voting right can be transferred because the 
authentication document is not related to any secret information of the voters. 
This is a severe threat to the fairness of a voting system. 
7.2 The Proposed Electronic Voting System 
7.2.1 The Proposed Election Model 
Our system is designed for realising the digitalization of large-scale elections 
conducted by a government. Arbitrary voting schemes are allowed. It is assumed 
that the community is supported by a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), where 
each voter possesses a public-private key pair and one can generate a liable digital 
signature with his own private key. The parties involved include the Voters, the 
Registrar, Administrator, Collector and a trusted third party (TTP). 
1. Voters 
They refer to the group of people who have the right to vote in a particular 
election. 
58 
Chapter 7 Anonymous Electronic Voting Systems 
2. Registrar 
It is the server responsible for voter verification and anonymity service 
provision. 
3. Administrator 
It is the server responsible for conducting the polling process and announc-
ing the results. 
4. Collector 
It is the server responsible for collecting the ballots. It is the digital analogy 
of the vote-collecting box. 
5. Trust Third Party (TTP) 
This is an independent party who is responsible for handling disputes. The 
court is an example. 
All of the Registrar, Administrator and the Collector are servers reside in 
the government or any parties that is responsible for holding the election. The 
Registrar and the Administrator may not necessarily be two separated servers. 
There is also a public counter, which is universally readable. The number shown 
represents the number of ballots accepted and its initial value is set to zero. 
There are three phases in the election. The Registration Phase, the Polling 
Phase and also the Vote Opening Phase. 
1. The Registration Phase 
In this phase, the valid voters registrar for the election and obtain an 
anonymous voting pass from the Registrar. 
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2. The Polling Phase 
During this phase the voters vote with their anonymous passes obtained 
in phase one. Each voter can only vote once. This phase can be divided 
into two sub-phases. Namely the voter authentication phase and the poll-
casting phase. The polling phase can also be regarded as the polling period. 
The polling phase and the registration phase can run simultaneously. After 
the Administrator accepted a valid vote from the voter, the public counter 
will be increased by one. 
3. Vote Opening Phase 
This phase begins after the polling phase. The result is computed and 
published. 
In our system, the voters can vote in any locations with any devices that can 
be connected to the network. However, they are required to vote in a voting 
station for absolute imcoercibility. 
7.3 Two Cryptographic Protocols 
This section explains two cryptographic protocols specially designed for our 
voting scheme. In section 3.1 we describe an authentication protocol which is 
innovated by the E-Cash protocol [19]. In section 3.2 we describe a modified 
commitment protocol. 
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7.3.1 Protocol One - The Anonymous Authentication Pro-
tocol 
The anonymous authentication protocol is designed for supporting the non-
transferable anonymous voting pass of our system. We have modified the check 
withdrawal transaction protocol in [19] so that the following desirable properties 
can be achieved: 
1. Alice can prove the knowledge of her secret key anonymously. 
2. Anyone who passes the random challenge must possess the knowledge of 
Alice's secret key. This is to ensure that Alice cannot transfer the pass to 
other parties or she risks the disclosure of her private key. 
3. Unlike the original protocol in [19], the secret information is not released 
to the Administrator during the registration phase. 
We are going to describe how Alice obtains a non-transferable pass from Bob. 
Let Alice's private key be u and the corresponding public key be v, where u 
x^ = 1 (mod (j){q)) is the published modulus [9]. We also define the operation 
h{x) as 
h(x) = a^ (mod n) 
where a is a published element in GF(q). h{x) is a one way function. It is 
computationally difficult to calculate x from h(x) and a [45' • 
The description of Protocol One is as follows: 
1. Alice first generates k candidates (called 7]) in the following way. She 
generates the random integers ai,bi,Ci and n for i : 1 to k. Then she 
computes: 
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Xi = g{ai + u, bi) 
Vi = g(-ai,ci) 
and Ti = r^ ^ • f (xi , yi) (mod n) 
Where (e, n) is the public key of Bob. /，g are some two-argument collision-
free functions, a^  + ( - a ^ 三 0 (mod F{q)), where (v, q) is the public key 
of Alice. 
2. Alice presents the k to Bob. 
3. Bob randomly splits the integers 1,…，左 into two ordered sets, S and 5", 
each consists of k/2 elements. He then sends S to Alice. 
4. Alice sends the values of h{-ai) and n for all i e S to Bob. 
5- Bob generates a A;/2-bit binary random challenge vector z = (20, Zi, ...， 
and sends it to Alice. The i仇 bit in z corresponds to the z*^  element in S. 
6- Alice responds according to the following rule: 
-when Zi = 0, Alice sends Bob aj + u, bj and yj； 
-when Zi = 1, Alice sends Bob - a j , C j and xj. 
Where j is the i仇 element in S. 
7. Bob verifies accordingly: 
-when Zi = 0，Bob checks if {h{aj + u). h(-aj)Y = a (mod q). He then 
checks if the corresponding are valid; 
-when Zi = 1，Bob checks if the h ( - a i ) presented by Alice previously can 
be derived from -a^ . He then checks if the corresponding are valid. 
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8. If Ti is valid for all i e S, Bob signs on the other k/2 unopened with 
his private key d and returns to Alice: 
n Tf (mod n) 
i它S' 
9. Alice removes the blinding factors and form 
n fi^uViY (mod n) 
i^S' 
Which is Bob's signature on the pass 
屯 = n fi^i^Vi) (mod n). 
i^S' 
Notice that steps (4) to (7) are necessary in order to ensure that Alice's 
private key, u, is included in the pass 屯. 
When Alice shows her pass to Bob, the following steps will be taken: 
10. Alice presents the anonymous pass 屯 to Bob. 
11. Bob checks if the signature on 少 is valid. 
12. Bob generates a A;/2-bit binary random challenge vector z = (ZQ, Z i , Z k / 2 ) 
and sends it to Alice. The i仇 bit in z corresponds to the i仇 element in S\ 
13. Alice responds according to the following rule: 
-when Zi = 0, Alice sends Bob aj + u, bj and yj； 
-when Zi = 1, Alice sends Bob - a j , C j and Xj. 
Where j is the i仇 element in S\ 
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14. Bob checks if 屯 can be derived from the partial openings. If so, authenti-
cation will be granted. 
Notice that Alice remains anonymous to Bob because both 少 and the partial 
openings do not contain plain information on Alice's identity. Furthermore, one 
must know the values of ai + u, - a i , bi and Q for all i in S, in order to succeed in 
tlie challenge on 少.This means that the proving party is able to access Alice's 
private key u since 
ai-\-u+ (-di)三 u (mod F(q)) for any i in S\ 
Therefore if Alice sells her pass to a third party, she is releasing her private 
key u as well. 
7.3.2 Protocol Two - Anonymous Commitment 
In our system, the voter signs and commits on the vote anonymously. Neither the 
voter can deny a committed vote nor the administrator can change an accepted 
vote. This is achieved by the anonymous commitment protocol. The identity of 
a voter is only revealed to the TTP when disputes occur. 
We are going to illustrate how Alice commits on a message m using her 
private-public key pair (u, v) anonymously. 
Let H{x) be a multiplicative homomorphic one-way hash function as de-
scribed in [46], and we define the two-argument hash function H{x, y) as H{x'y). 
Due the multiplicative homomorphic property, 
H(x,y) = H(x'y) = H(x)-H{y). 
To commit on rn, Alice submit the followings to Bob: 
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(m\\H(m)\\H(Sigriu(m))\\H(m, SignJjri)) 
where SignJjn) denotes Alice's signature on m using her private key u. Bob 
accepts the commitment if H{m) • H(Signu{m)) = H[m, Signu{m)). Notice 
that Alice remains anonymous. 
We give a brief security analysis of protocol two here. 
1. Alice cannot deny the committed message m because Bob cannot generate 
H(Signu{m)). 
2. Bob cannot change m because he cannot generate a valid H{Signu{m')) 
on m'. 
3. Alice cannot cheat by submitting the followings 
{m\\H{rn)\\H{Signu(m'))\\H(m, Signu(m')) 
to Bob but claiming m is modified from m' by Bob. This is because the 
TTP will ask Alice to sign on m', which she claims the original message 
is. It is easy to find out that H(Signu(m')) . H(m') ^ H(m, Signu{m')). 
Both Protocol One and Protocol Two will be employed in our voting protocol. 
This will be introduced in the next section. 
7.4 The Electronic Voting Protocol 
The main innovation in our protocol is the employment of a non-transferable 
anonymous voting pass, which is innovated by the E-Cash scheme [19]. In ad-
dition, the modified commitment scheme eliminates the submission of a vote-
opening key by the voters. In this section we describe the proposed E-Voting 
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protocol phase by phase. 
7.4.1 The Registration Phase 
Suppose Alice is a valid voter in the election. Before she polls, she needs to 
register for the election and obtains an anonymous voting pass from the Regis-
trar. The Registrar holds a list of names of the valid voters. Step (1) to (9) of 
Protocol One is run, with Bob being replaced by the Registrar. The resulting 
pass tp is the voting pass. 
7.4.2 The Polling Phase 
Two successive sub-phases are involved in the polling phase. Namely the voter 
authentication and vote-casting processes. The Administrator is responsible for 
the execution of this phase. 
Voter Authentication 
The authentication process is done by step (10) to (14) in Protocol One. With 
Bob being replaced by the Administrator. Authentication is granted upon the 
successful verification on an unused ip. 
Poll-Casting 
The poll-casting phase is run immediately after the voter authentication phase. 
Protocol Two is run, with Bob being replaced by the Administrator. Also, the 
message m is replaced by the ballot (3. Alice submits the following encrypted 
token 
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EncTyptMm\mSignM)\\H(P,SignM) 
to the Administrator, where SignJ^P) denotes the signature of /? with u, the 
private key of Alice. The entire token is encrypted with c, the asymmetric en-
cryption key of the Collector. The Collector is the digital analogy of submitting 
the ballot into the voting box. 
After accepting the ballot from the valid voter, the public counter will be 
increased by one. A reference number is also recorded and saved at the Admin-
istrator. 
The voter authentication sub-phases and the vote-casting sub-phase are two 
non-separable processes. If interruption occurs, the first sub-phase should be 
run again. This is necessary in order to ensure that the ballot is submitted by 
the valid pass holder. 
7.4.3 Vote-Opening Phase 
After the polling period, the Collector sends the decryption key c，to the Ad-
ministrator. The Administrator decrypts the tokens collected in the vote-casting 
phase, it also verifies and counts the votes. 
The final result is calculated. A result list, which is shown in Table 7.1 is 
published. 
Given n is the total number of ballots collected, the first column shows the 
reference number of a particular ballot; and the second column lists the content 
of the ballot in concern. Notice that n should equal to the final reading on 
the counter. It is easy to check if the Administrator has varied any ballots. A 
particular voter can also check if her vote has been counted correctly. This will 
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Computational Speed of Hash Functions Evaluation 
against other Operations 
be discussed in next section. 
7.5 Security Analysis 
Our electronic voting protocol satisfies the basic security requirements listed in 
some of the previous electronic-voting papers, such as those listed in [39] and 
47]. In additional, our protocol is a receipt-free scheme, in which the voters 
cannot sell the votes to the others using the receipts. Also, neither the voter 
can deny a committed vote nor the administrator can change an accepted vote. 
7.5.1 Basic Security Requirements 
According to [39], the basic security requirements in an election system include 
completeness, soundness, privacy, uiireusability, eligibility, fairness and verifia-
bility. In this subsection, we analyze the security of our systems in terms of 
these parameters. 
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Completeness 
In [39], completeness is interpreted as all valid votes are counted correctly. Our 
system satisfies the completeness requirement because the Administrator cannot 
change or drop an accepted vote. The final number shown on the public counter 
indicates the number of ballots collected. Any drop of votes can be detected by 
the incorrectness of the counter. Moreover, our system prevents the Administra-
tor from miscounting the votes because it is possible to determine if the voting 
result is correct from the published table. Also, the voters are allowed to check 
their voting record at a trusted third party (TTP) after the vote-opening phase. 
When a voter wants to check her voting record, she presents together 
with the request to the TTP. Upon receiving the request, the TTP verifies ip 
using step (9) to (13) in protocol two, with Alice and Bob being replaced by 
the voter and the TTP respectively. If the verification is successful, it asks 
the Administrator for the reference number of the corresponding vote. This 
reference number will not be signed by the TTP and it is passed to the voter. 
She can check against the published list and see if her vote has been counted 
correctly. The voter remains anonymous. 
As illustrated in Protocol Two, any change of vote by the Administrator can 
be detected. Further actions will be taken if disputes occur. 
Soundness 
Soundness refers to the inability of a dishonest voter to disrupt the voting. In 
our system, the voter cannot deny a committed vote, nor she can frame up the 
Administrator for changing his vote. This has been explained in section 3.2 and 
we do not repeat here. 
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Privacy 
Privacy ensures a voter's vote being kept secret such that no one other than the 
voter knows her choice. Since the voting passes in our system are anonymous, 
voter privacy is provided. The voter's identity is only revealed to a trusted third 
party when dispute occurs. 
Unreusability 
In our system, no one is able to vote twice. Any reuse of the voting pass is 
disallowed. The Administrator makes sure that every pass is used only once 
during the voter authentication phase. 
Eligibility 
In an eligibility-supported voting system, anyone who is not allowed to vote 
cannot vote. In our system, the voting right of a voter is validated during the 
registration phase. Therefore the voting pass is only issued to the eligible voters. 
Multiple Registrars can be employed [48] in order to prevent a cheating Registrar 
from issuing voting passes to ineligible voters. 
Moreover, the voting passes in our system are non-transferable. No ineligible 
voters can vote by buying a voting pass. 
Fairness 
In a fair voting system, nothing can affect the voting [39]. Our system is a fair 
system. Firstly, the Administrator cannot change a committed ballot. Secondly, 
a voter cannot sell her vote using the receipt because our system is receipt-free. 
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Thirdly, the voting passes are noii-transferable so that the unauthorized parties 
cannot vote. Lastly, the final result is published and can be verified. 
Verifiability 
According to [39], the verifiability is interpreted as whether there are any parties 
who can falsify the result of voting. In our system, the overall election results 
as well as the ballots are published. In addition, the voters are allowed to check 
their votes. Therefore our system supports the verifiability requirement. 
7.5.2 Receipt-freeness 
In some early electronic voting proposal such as [19], [39], [49] and [50], the 
voters are able to show to a third party how the vote is cast. Such systems are 
not receipt-free and they are against the fairness requirement of a voting system. 
A definition of receipt-freeness has been given in [40]. According to this 
definition, an electronic voting system is receipt-free if the voter V^  can cast a 
vote V* Vi and is accepted by the coercer, who wants to interfere the voting 
decision of Vi； while Vi is the favorite vote of the coercer. Our system is a receipt-
free system because the voter has no evidence to prove how her vote has been 
cast. Unlike the scheme proposed in [39], the Administrator issues no signed 
document on how the vote has been received. Also, the bulletin board lists only 
the received ballots without the voter information. Therefore the voters cannot 
show how they vote in the election. 
Even if the voter checks her vote at the TTP after the election, no receipt 
will be generated and she still cannot prove her vote to the coercer. Notice that 
the checker must possess the corresponding private key resides in Y as explained 
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in section 3.1. Therefore only the voter in concern can check her voting record 
and she cannot prove her vote to a third party directly. 
7.5.3 Non-transferability of Voting Right 
We believe that the voting right must not be transferable in an eligible voting 
system. This requirement, however, is violated in a number of electronic voting 
proposals such as [31], [42], [43] and [44. 
We have proposed the non-transferable voting pass in our paper. The voting 
pass contains the information of the private key of the holder. Our algorithm has 
been carefully designed so that the pass issuer can ensure that the private key is 
included in the pass，while no information about the private key is revealed. As 
illustrated in section 3.1’ one must know the values of (li + u,-cii,bi, and Cj for 
all i in S, in order to succeed in the challenge on the voting pass. This means 
that the proving party must be able to access Alice's private key u since 
ai-\-u+ (-tti)三 u (mod F(n')) for any i in S\ 
Therefore if Alice sells her pass to a third party, she is releasing her private 
key u as well. This explains why the voting pass is non-transferable. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have pointed out the requirement of iion-traiisferability of 
voting right. Two cryptographic protocols, the anonymous authentication proto-
col and the anonymous commitment protocol, are presented. We have proposed 
a new electronic voting system in which the voters vote with the non-transferable 
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voting passes, such voting passes are achieved by the anonymous authentication 
protocol. In addition, our system is receipt-free and it satisfies the basic security 
requirements include completeness, soundness, privacy, unreiisability, eligibility, 
fairness and verifiability. 
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Anonymous Internet Access 
8.1 Introduction 
The rapid development of the Internet has made a revolution over our daily 
life. Information is abundantly and easily accessible to everyone who has a 
connection to the world wide information superhighway. Internet applications 
like electronic commerce, electronic messaging (e.g. E-mails) as well as the 
World Wide Web provide great convenience to the modern society and eventually 
transform commerce, education，provision of government services and almost 
every other aspect of modern life. 
However, the privacy issues accompanying these innovations cannot be ne-
glected. The potential interception or misuse of personal data collected from 
the provision of Internet services is a threat to user privacy. Moreover, the rapid 
development of data mining technologies makes this threat even more severe. 
This results in the calling of anonymous Internet access. 
We believe that anonymity should be provided conditionally. In the later 
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part of this chapter, we will propose a cryptographic solution that can achieve 
conditional anonymous Internet connections, which is developed based on the 
Electronic Cash Protocol introduced in [19]. In our protocol, user anonymity is 
maintained so long as the user does not misbehave. In this way, user privacy is 
protected while anonymity is not abused. 
8.2 Privacy Issues of Internet Access Services 
Internet services providers can learn much about their customers, as all infor-
mation that will pass to an Internet user must first pass through the proxies 
reside in their servers. Although encryption techniques such as SSL are used so 
that third parties cannot interpret the contents being transmitted, the ISP can 
still determine what web sites or even which article a particular user has visited. 
This is because every Internet object request originated from the users is logged 
in the ISP's proxy cache. This is referred as the 'clicktrails' data collection. Col-
lecting and analyzing the 'clicktrails' data can derive much information about a 
person. 
8.2.1 Present Privacy Laws and Policies 
The collection of personal data is unavoidable in many occasions (e.g. opening 
a bank account), Some existing privacy ordinances such as [51] allows service 
providers to collect user's private information for the purpose intended, but 
prevents them from changing the usage of such data. For the case of Internet 
services provision, at present, an ISP has right to collect，dicktrails，data and 
hold log files of user Internet usage for the purposes of system maintenance and 
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troubleshooting. Individual ISP also has own policy on privacy, however the 
standard diverges and user privacy is sometimes not properly protected. 
8.2.2 Present Anonymous Internet Services Solutions 
Several anonymous Internet services technologies have been developed. They 
aim at hiding the user identity from the remote sites. For example, the anony-
mous web servers such as [52] fetches the requested objects on behalf of the 
users, so that the remote host receives the request apparently originated from 
the server. There are also technologies such as the Onion Routing [53] providing 
anonymous connection in which routing information is hidden. 
8.2.3 Conditional Anonymous Internet Access Services 
In order to prevent the abuse of the data in log files, users should remain anony-
mous to the ISP during Internet object requests. This can be achieved by using 
cryptographic methods. In Section three of this paper, we will present a condi-
tional anonymous Internet access protocol that have the following features: 
• User is anonymous to the ISP during Internet access. 
• The ISP has no way to relate a requested object to its requester even if it 
is fetched via the ISP's proxy. 
• The anonymity is conditional, the user identity is revealed when any mis-
behavior is detected. 
• This protocol is transparent to other applications; and it is interoperable 
among different ISP's. 
76 
Chapter 8 Anonymous Internet Access 
Here we assume the employment of caller-ID blocking so that the ISP cannot 
trace the user identity from the phone number. 
8.3 The Protocol 
We developed our protocol motivated by the E-Casli protocol proposed in [19 . 
In our system, the user login with a pass 
{xj{xy/^ (mod n)) 
in which the first term is the pseudonym of the user and the second term is the 
ISP's public key signature [9]. Here n is a published composite and only the ISP 
knows its factors, /(•) is a one-way function known by both the user and the 
ISP and X is the pseudonym chosen by the user. We firstly introduce a simpler 
version of the protocol, in which anonymous Internet connection without user 
identity recovery is achieved. In later section, we will discuss how the protocol 
is modified so that the user's identity can be revealed in case of any misbehavior 
occurrence. 
8.3.1 ISP issues a new pass to Alice using blind signature 
1] scheme 
To open a new account, Alice generates x and r, where x is a pseudonym with 
which she will use to access the Internet services and r is a blinding factor. These 
numbers only known by Alice. She presents the following token: 
T = r'^ • f(x) (mod n) 
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to the ISP. 
Upon receiving T and having verified on Alice's identity, the ISP signs on 
T by calculating the third root of T modulo n and returns T^/^ (mod n), 
i.e. r . /(a:) 1/3 (mod n), to Alice. It is assumed that only the server has the 
knowledge to compute the third root modulo n [9]. Alice then extracts /(工)"3 
(mod n) from the returned token by dividing T"'� (mod ri) with r and form 
her pass: 
pass = (mod n)). 
This pass is saved at Alice's side. She logins with this anonymous pass 
instead of her login name from now on. The server has no way to relate Alice 
to her pseudonym x because it cannot see the value of x when it signs on T. 
8.3.2 Account Operations 
An account for x-is created, where x'is the pseudonym of Alice. When Alice login, 
she presents the pass pass instead of using her own useriiame and password. 
Authentication is done by verifying the value of (mod n). from pass. 
All other account operations are similar to the existing system. Since the server 
has no knowledge on the identity of x, anonymous Internet service provision is 
achieved. 
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8.4 Modified Version with Key Escrow on User 
Identity 
In Section 3 we have presented the simpler version of our protocol. In this 
section，we modify on it so that the following desirable additional properties can 
be achieved: 
• Alice is the only legitimate user of the pass. 
• Alice's identity will be revealed when necessary. 
The modification is based on the double spending prevention solution pre-
sented in [19]. The later property enables identity revocation in critical situa-
tions. In the modified version of the protocol, a trusted third party (TTP) is 
involved. And a valid pass has the following format: 
{pseudonym, [pseudonym] �sPsign, {pseudonym}TTPsign)-
Here we make the same assumption that only the ISP has the knowledge to 
compute the third root modulo n. 
8.4.1 Getting a new pass 
Let / and g be some two-argument collision-free functions as described in [19. 
And let u be a unique identifying number of Alice (e.g. the account number) 
Instead of producing a single blinding factor r as in the previous section, four 
independent sets of random numbers each consists of k elements, a, c, d and r 
are generated. 
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In order to obtain the blind signature from the ISP, Alice forms and sends k 
TVs in the following maimer: 
Ti = rf • f{xi, Vi) (mod n) 
where 
i = 1 to k 
工I = ff(at, Ci) 
and 
Vi = g {(H XOR u, di). 
Notice that at this stage, The ISP knows Alice's identity, u. In order to 
verify the TVs presented by Alice, the ISP undergoes the following steps: 
1. It chooses randomly a set of k/2 integers, R = [ij}, where 1 < ij < k and 
l<i< k/2. 
2. It asks Alice to show the values of r;，a;，a and di for every i in R. 
3. It compares the k/2 presented T '^s and see if it can be derived from these 
Vi, (li, Ci, di and u. 
After that, the ISP gives Alice 
n 了广 ( m o d n) 
im 
And Alice can easily extract the following component: 
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n / f e ’ ? / z ) i " (mod n) 
i^R 
which is correspond to the ISP's blind signature on the pseudonym, 
P= n fi^i^Vi) (mod n). 
i^R 
Notice that the ISP has no way to relate w to p because it cannot see Xi and 队 
for i 车 R. 
Alice also needs to get the signature from the TTP. Before signing on p, the 
TTP verifies the validity of p and writes part of the information about Alice's 
identity into the database. Notice that Alice is anonymous to the TTP and 
the information obtained by the TTP is not enough for it to compute Alice's 
identity. 
To perform this task, the same set of k TVs are presented to the TTP. The 
TTP then performs the following procedures: 
1. It asks Alice to give the values of n,工“ (a^ XOR u), and di for every i 
2. It verifies if the corresponding TVs can be derived from the presented val-
ues. 
3. If the verification succeeds, the TTP stores the values (a^ XOR u) along 
with p into the database. 
The TTP then verifies and signs on the pseudonym p\ 
1. Base on the values collected from the above stage, it verifies if p is indeed 
constructed from the TVs where R' = {i e Z : i ^ R,1 < ij < k}. 
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2. It signs on the pseudonym using normal public-key signature schemes. 
Upon receiving the TTP's signature, Alice can then form the pass: 
{pseudonym, {pseudonym}rsPsian, {pseudonym}TTPsign)-
In the process of pass verification just mentioned above, the cryptographic 
method, zero-knowledge proof is employed. It enables one to prove his/her 
identity to the other party without revealing the identity. More details can be 
found in [54 . 
8.4.2 Account operations 
Account operations can be performed as usual. However, there are some differ-
ences in pass verification. 
The verification of a pass includes three procedures, namely the verifications 
of the ISP signatures and that of the TTP signatures, arid also the process to 
ensure Alice (who is anonymous to the ISP) is indeed a valid holder of the pass. 
The first two processes can be performed directly using the public-key sig-
nature verification schemes. While the last part is done by the following: 
1. The ISP generate a random binary vector Z = (zuz2,…，孙/2) where the 
element Zi correspond to the i仇 number in the set R'. 
2. Alice responds according to the following rule: 
• when Zi = 1，Alice send the ISP a^, a , and yi. 
• when Zi = 0, Alice send the ISP Xi, and yi. 
3. Prom the received values, the ISP can check if the corresponding values 
satisfies the pass. 
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8.4.3 Identity revocation 
In this protocol, a user remains anonymous so long as he/she does not misbehave. 
In this way, a limited anonymity is provided so that user privacy cannot be 
abused. This is done by the cryptographic method of secret splitting; in which 
a piece of secret is divided among two or more parties and each party alone does 
not have knowledge about the secret [55'. 
When misbehavior of the holder of p is detected or in case of any appeals, the 
court asks the ISP to presents the pass p along with cii for i e R'; which it obtains 
during pass verification process. The court also gathers the corresponding (ai 
XOR u) for j e S where S = B,U B! from the TTP. Notice that S n R!章{0} 
and let e be an element in S n R'• The user identity u is revealed as: 
u = a, XOR (a,. XOR u). 
8.5 Security Analysis 
This section analyzes on the strength of our protocol in resistance of different 
potential threats. 
8.5.1 Anonymity 
Alice remains anonymous to the ISP. This is because during the stage of pass 
issuing, Alice prepares k candidates of TVs and the ISP only random challenges 
on k/2 of them. The other k/2 values which are used to form the pass are 
never seen by the ISP. During the authentication process, the ISP only random 
challenges on the k/2 unseen values. Therefore the ISP cannot relate the identity 
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of Alice to the pass that she possesses. 
8.5.2 Masquerade 
During the pass issuing stage, Alice is not anonymous and the ISP should make 
sure Alice's identity before signing on the pass. This can be done by employing 
a digital certificate scheme; in which one's identity is proved by a recognized 
digital certificate. In this way, the identity of the pass receiver can be ensured. 
8.5.3 Alice cheats 
Since the ISP views only half of the k candidates of ri,(ii,Ci and di, where 
z e R. Therefore in the pass issuing process Alice may have chance to cheat. 
She does this by not using a valid u in the calculation of those k/2 TVs which 
are not viewed by the ISP. However her chance of successful cheating decreases 
exponentially with the value of k. For example, when k equals 16’ the chance 
for the ISP choosing none of the Alice's cheated TVs is l/2» = 0.0039. When k 
increases to 32 the chance further decreases to = 1.526 x 10"^. 
8.5.4 Stolen pass 
Suppose Alice's pass is stolen by Carol during the pass issuing stage, this will 
not bring any lost to Alice because Carol does not know the secrets that Alice 
is holding. That is, Carol does not know ai,Ci and yi for every i e R' which 
involve in the random challenge process during future logins. Therefore Carol 
cannot use the pass. 
Suppose Carol steals the pass at later stages so that she also steals the 
84 
Chapter- 8 Anonymous Internet Access 
numbers a“Ci and yi for some i € R!. In this case, however, she cannot use the 
pass until she obtains ai,Ci and y, for every i e R'. This is because different 
elements in a, c and y are challenged randomly each time so Carol can only 
obtain some of them each time. When Carol has waited long enough to collect 
ai，Ci and yi for every i e R', Alice may has already changed her pass. 
8.6 Efficiency 
Compare with the non-anonymous Internet access scheme, our secure anony-
mous Internet access protocol may require more computational power. In this 
section we analyze on the computational effort involved. 
8.6.1 Random number generation 
During the initial stage where the pass is issued, a total number of U random 
integers need to be generated. Where k is suitable and large enough to prevent 
cheat from any potential parties, as explained in Section 5.3. For example, if k 
= 3 2 , then 128 random numbers are generated. 
The number-of-bit of these random numbers are arbitrary. For example, 
when 32-bit binary numbers are used, the possible variation for the values of 
r “ a “ c “ d i equals 二 4294967296. When 64-bit binary number is used in-
stead，the number of possible variations of these values is increased to = 
18446744073709551616. The higher the number-of-bit, the more secure but 
slower of the system is. 
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8.6.2 Signing on the pass 
Blind signature by the ISP 
When the ISP makes a blind signature on Alice's pass, it needs to verify the pass 
using cut-and-choose method. This involves verification on the k/2 presented 
TVs; and each of the verification involves 3 hashes. The ISP also need to verify 
Alice's identity and this involves one public-key certificate verification. Therefore 
the ISP needs to undergo 3k/2 hashes, one certificate verification and 1 public-
key signature when it signs on a pass. 
Signature by the TTP 
For the TTP, two procedures are involved in the signing process. Firstly it ver-
ifies the Xi, {tti XOR u), and di for every i This involves 2k hashes. Secondly 
checks if the k/2 TVs involves in the pass are valid. This requires another k 
hashes. Therefore the TTP needs to undergo 3k hashes and 1 public-key signa-
ture when it signs on a pass. 
8.6.3 Pass validation 
When a user login, the ISP undergoes random challenge and checks if the user is 
a legitimate holder of the pass. This involves a generation of a A;/2-bit random 
binary number and 2z hashes, where z is the number of I's in the binary number 
and z G A;/2. 
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8.6.4 Identity recovery 
When the user misbehaves, his/her identity is going to be revealed. This simply 
requires one searching and one XOR calculation. 
To conclude, most operations undergone in our protocol are hashes, and they 
are light in terms of computational power [56'. 
8.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have pointed out the privacy problems involved in Internet 
access. We also proposed a cryptographic solution to the problem; which is 
motivated by the electronic cash protocols. Our protocol supports anonymous 
user login to a proxy server so that the Internet usage habit of a user cannot be 
traced and analyzed. However the user cannot abuse his/her anonymity because 
our protocol enable a misbehaved user's identity to be revealed. This is achieved 
by a key escrow method in which a, trusted third party keeps half of the secret 
about the user's identity. 
In addition, our protocol resides on the application layer and does not require 
changes in other layers during implementation. With suitable legislation, user 




III this thesis, we have made a thorough study on electronic money. We started 
from the history of money. The properties and the requirements of money are 
also described. Because of the change in the way people conducting business, 
from traditional commerce to digital commerce, a new form of medium of trans-
action is required. In Chapter 4 and chapter 5，two main categories of electronic 
money: Electronic Cash and Micropayments are discussed. Comparisons be-
tween macropayment (electronic cash) systems and micropayment systems are 
made. 
However, the contribution of electronic money is not only limited to p r o 
viding a new form of medium of transaction in the Digital Age. Applications 
such as electronic voting and Internet privacy provision are derived from the 
electronic cash protocols. In this thesis, three innovative cryptographic appli-
cations that derived from electronic cash protocols are proposed. Namely the 
Anonymous Micropayment Tickets, Non-transferable Electronic Voting Passes 
and the Anonymous Internet Access Service. 
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In the Anonymous Micropayment Tickets protocol, a new concept: Micro-
payment in form of a ticket is proposed. In traditional micropayment protocols, 
security requirements have to be loosed because of their efficiency and low pro-
cessing cost. In most case, anonymity is not provided. In the micropayment 
ticket protocol, a ticket can be used for more then once so that the overheads 
can be used repeatedly thus saves the computational cost. Elliptic curve digital 
signature is used for double spending prevention. This protocol is very suit-
able for implementation on the devices that contain a user certificate (can be 
anonymous or non-anonymous, thus may or may not retain its anonymity). 
The Non-transferable Electronic Voting Passes, which is proposed in chapter 
7，enable a more secure receipt-free electronic voting system. In the proposed 
system，a voter votes by registering anonymously and obtaining a voting pass. 
By carefully designed cryptographic algorithms, the voter's private key is em-
bedded inside the pass so that only the true owner of the voting pass can use the 
pass. This is a new feature added to the cryptography-based receipt-free elec-
tronic voting systems. In this chapter, we have also proposed the anonymous 
commitment protocol, which eliminates the submission of a vote opening key 
by the voters after the polling period. The Non-transferable Electronic Voting 
Passes has been implemented on the Java platform and a test system is being 
used in the Department of Information Engineering, the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. 
In chapter 8, the electronic cash protocol is modified so that it supports an 
application which is quite unrelated to electronic cash. The Anonymous Internet 
Access protocol, which is derived from the protocol proposed in [19] provides 
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Internet user privacy by establishing conditional anonymous accounts. The im-
plementation of this protocol only require modifications in the application layer, 
therefore is very convenient for the existing systems. Moreover, this protocol 
can be applied to the anonymous service provision of other applications such as 
Internet auction and anonymous certificates. 
To conclude, electronic cash is important in the Information Revolution. 
This is not only because it can support the ever-growing electronic commerce in 
terms of a medium of transaction, but also because of its potential contributions. 
This thesis only lists three of the possible variations. We also believe that upon 
further modifications and development, electronic cash will gain a majority share 
on the market. 
90 
Appendix 
Papers Derived from this Thesis 
1. Y. Chan. On Privacy Issues of Internet Access via Proxy Servers. Pro-
ceedings of CQRE, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 
1999. 
2. Rosaiiiia Y. Chan, Jonathan C. Wong, Alex C. Chan. Anonymous Elec-
tronic Voting System with Non-Transferable Voting Passes. Proceedings 
of SEC2000, to appear. 
Bibliography 
1] David Chaum. "Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments," Advances in 
Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO'82, 1982. 
2] "The Global Market Forecast for Internet Usage and Commerce." IDC, 
June 1999. 
3] "Mondex Electronic Cash." [web page], 2000. http://www.mondex.com/  
Accessed 17 April 2000: 
:4] H. Feistel. "Cryptographic Coding for Data-Bank Privacy." RC 2827, IBM 
Research, 1970. 
5] National Bureau of Standard. "Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS), Publication 46: The Data Encryption Standard." 1977. 
:6] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). "Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 46-1: Data Encryption 
Standard." 1988. 
;7] American National Standards Institute (ANSI). "ANSI X9.17-1985: Finan-
cial Institution Key Management." 1985. 
91 
:8] Lai, X. "On Design and Security of Block Ciphers." ETH Series in Infor-
mation Processing, Vol. 1，Koiistanz, Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 1992. 
:9] Rivest, R.L., A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. "A Method for Obtaining Digital 
Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems." Communications of the ACM, 
V. 21, n . 2, 1978. 
10] M. O. Rabin, R. DeMillo, D. Dobkin, A. Jones, and R. Lipton. "Digitalised 
Signatures." Foundations of Secure Computation, 155-168, Academic Press, 
1978. 
11] N. Koblitz. "Elliptic Curve Cryptosysteiris." Mathematics of Computation, 
V.48，N. 177, pp.203-209，1987. 
12] V. S. Miller. "Use of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography." Advances in Cryp-
tology - Proceedings of CRYPTO,85, 1985. 
13] N. Koblitz. "Algebraic Aspects of Cryptography." Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 
1999. 
14] Hendrickson, Robert A. "The Cashless Society." New York, Dodd, Mead 
and Company, 1972. 
15] Edward Bellamy. "Looking Backward." London, W. Foulsham and Co. Ltd., 
1888. 
16] Honor Croome. "Introduction to Money." Methiieii and Co. Ltd., 1962. 
17] E.Victor Morgan. "A History of Money," Penguin Books, 1965. 
18] Davies, Glyn. "A history of money from ancient times to the present day." 
Revised Edition. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996. 
19] David Chaum, Amos Fiat, Mom Naor. "Untraceable Electronic Cash." Ad-
vances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO'88, 1988. 
20] Tatsuaki Okamoto, Kaziio Ohta. "Universal Electronic Cash." Advances in 
Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO,91, 1991. 
21] Donal O'Mahony, Michael Peirce, Hitesh Teware. "Electronic Payment Sys-
tems." Artech House, 1997. 
22] eCash Technologies, [web page], 2000. http://www.digicash.com/ [Accessed 
17 April 2000； 
23] Boly, J. P., et al. "The ESPRIT Project CAFE." Computer Security - ES-
ORICS'94, Third European Symposium on Research in Computer Security 
Proceedings., Lecture Notes in Computer Science，Vol. 875, 1994. 
24] Bosselaers, A., et al. "Functionality of the Basic Protocols." Technical Re-
port, ESPRIT Project 7023 (CAFE), 1995. 
25] David Chaum. "Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments." Advances in 
Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO'82, 1982. 
26] Bos, J•，and D. Chaum. "Smart Cash: A Practical Electronic Payment 
System." Technical Report, CWI-Report: CS49035, 1990. 
27] Medvinsky, G., and B. Clifford Neumaii. "NetCash: A Desihn for Practical 
Electronic Currency on the Internet." Proceedings of First ACM Conference 
on Computer and Communication Security, 1993. 
28] CyberCash, Inc. [web page], 1999. http://www.cybercash.com/ [Accessed 
17 April 2000] 
29] Rivest, R., and A. Shamir. “ Pay Word and MicroMirit: Two Simple Micro-
payment Schemes." 1996，http://tlieory.lcs.mit.edu/ rivest/RivestShamir-
mpay.ps 
30] Glassman，S.，et al. "The Milliceiit Protocol for Inexpensive Electronic 
Commerce." Proceedings 4th International World Wide Web Conference, 
1995. 
31] Michael J. Radwiri. "An Untraceable, Universally Verifiable Voting 
Scheme." Seminar in Cryptology, 1995. 
32] Rosanna Y. Chan, et al.. "Anonymous E-Voting System with Non-
Transrferable Voting Passes." to be appear, World Computer Congress, 
SEC2000’ 2000. 
33] D. Chaum. "Achieving Electronic Privacy." Scientific American, 1992. 
34] Y. Chan. "On Privacy Issues of Internet Access Services via Proxy Servers." 
Proceedings of CQRE,99, 1999. 
35] M. Franklin, M. Reiter. "The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auc_ 
tion Service." IEEE Transactions on Software Eiiginerring, Vol. 22, No. 5, 
1996. 
36] IEEE. P1363, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography. 
:37] Wenbo Mao. "A Simple Cash Payment Technique for the Internet." Pro-
ceedings of ESORICE，96, Springer-Verlag, 1996. 
38] David Chaum. "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital 
Pseudonyms." Communications of the ACM 2，1981. 
39] Atsushi Fujioka，Tatsuaki Okanioto, Kaziio Olita. "A Practical Secret Vot-
ing Scheme for Large Scale Election." Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings 
of AUSCRYPT92, 1992. 
40] Josh Benaloh and Dwight Tuiiistra. ” Receipt-Free Secret-Ballot Elections 
(Extended Abstract)." Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM Symposium on 
the Theory of Computing, 1994. 
41] Tatsuaki Okamoto. "Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Schemes for Large 
Scale Elections." Proceedings of Security Protocols '91, 1997. 
42] Yi Mu and Vijay Varadharajaii. "Anonymous Secure E-Voting over a Net-
work." Proceedings of 14th Annual Computer Security Applications Confer-
ence, 1998. 
43] Qi He and Zhongmiii Su. "A New Practical Secure e-Voting Scheme." Pro-
ceedings of SEC,98, 1998. 
44] A. Riera，J. Borrell and J. Rifa. "An Uiicoercible Verifiable Electronic Vot-
ing Protocol." Proceedings of SEC,98, 1998. 
45] K. S. McCurley. "The Discrete Logarithm Problem." Cryptology and Com-
putational Number Theory, v.42 of Proceedings of Symposia in Applied 
Mathematics, 1990. 
46] Josh Cohen Benaloh. "Secret Sharing Hoiriomorphisrris: Keeping Shares of 
a Secret Secret (Extended Abstract)." Proceedings of CRYPTO,86, 1986. 
47] Ronald Cramer, Matthew Franklin, Berry Schoeiirriakers and Moti Yung. 
"Multi-Authority Secret-Ballot Elections with Linear Work." Proceedings 
of EUROCRYPT,96, 1996. 
:48] Brandon William DuRette. "Multiple Administrators for Electronic Vot-
ing." MIT Thesis, 1999. 
:49] J. Cohen and M. Fischer. "A Robust and Verifiable Cryptographically Se-
cure Election Scheme." Proceedings of the 26th IEEE Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, 1985. 
50] Josh Beiialoh and Moti Yung. "Distributing the Power of a Government to 
Enhance the Privacy of Voters." Proceedings of 5th ACM Symposium on 
Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986. 
51] The Government of Hong Kong SAR of the People Republic of China. 
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Version date 20 Dec 1996, 1996. 
52] The Anoiiymizer. [web page], 1999. http://www.anonymizer.com/ [Ac-
cessed 6 Sept 1999 
[53] Reed M.G, Syverson R F , Goldsclilag D.M. "Proxies for anonymous rout-
ing.’，Proceedings, 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 
1996. 
54] Bruce Schneier. Applied Cryptography 2nd Edition, 1996. 
:55] H. Feistel. "Cryptographic Coding for Data-Bank Privacy." RC 2827, York-
town Heights, NY. IBM Research, 1970. 
56] D. O'Mahony, M. Peirce，H. Tewari. Electronic Payment Systems, 1997. 

T(LhEQ9E00 
mimM§ SBiJeJqtl >tHnD 
